Key Arguments

• He notes that the Journal du Peuple’s readers argue that since 'men and things exist, there always will be men who will possess things; nothing, therefore, can destroy property,' and he responds that 'you unconsciously argue exactly after the manner of M. Cousin, who always reasons from possession to property.'
• He gives a historical-semantic account: 'Originally, the word property was synonymous with proper or individual possession. It designated each individual’s special right to the use of a thing.'
• He explains that when 'the usufructuary converted his right to personally use the thing into the right to use it by his neighbor’s labor,' property 'changed its nature,' becoming a 'double right' (to use and to draw rent), while 'the right of use' alone came to be called 'possession.'
• He details how legists codified this distinction, reserving 'property' for the 'perfect right'—'jus perfectum, jus optimum, jus quiritarium, jus dominii'—and assimilating 'possession' to 'farm-rent.'
• He accepts that 'individual possession exists of right, or, better, from natural necessity,' but insists that 'when, in imitation of M. Cousin, we assume it to be the basis of the domain of property, we fall into the sophism called sophisma amphiboliae vel ambiguitatis, which consists in changing the meaning by a verbal equivocation.'
• He generalizes that 'All our errors arise from the constant confusion of these two kinds of abstractions'—the universal idea from identical facts vs. the historical order of meanings—and that this confusion is fostered by language’s ambiguities, which philosophers fail to 'neutralize.'
• He concludes from his prior argumentation that 'the difference between property and possession being well established, and it being settled that the former, for the reasons which I have just given, must necessarily disappear,' the conceptual distinction has decisive normative consequences.

Source Quotes

I hope that the self-love of the writer will not be offended, if, in the presence of the masses, I ignore an individual. You say, proletaires of the Peuple, “For the very reason that men and things exist, there always will be men who will possess things; nothing, therefore, can destroy property.” In speaking thus, you unconsciously argue exactly after the manner of M.

You say, proletaires of the Peuple, “For the very reason that men and things exist, there always will be men who will possess things; nothing, therefore, can destroy property.” In speaking thus, you unconsciously argue exactly after the manner of M. Cousin, who always reasons from possession to property. This coincidence, however, does not surprise me.

Certainly it is honorable, even for a philosopher, to be your companion in error. Originally, the word property was synonymous with proper or individual possession. It designated each individual’s special right to the use of a thing. But when this right of use, inert (if I may say so) as it was with regard to the other usufructuaries, became active and paramount⁠—that is, when the usufructuary converted his right to personally use the thing into the right to use it by his neighbor’s labor⁠—then property changed its nature, and its idea became complex.

It designated each individual’s special right to the use of a thing. But when this right of use, inert (if I may say so) as it was with regard to the other usufructuaries, became active and paramount⁠—that is, when the usufructuary converted his right to personally use the thing into the right to use it by his neighbor’s labor⁠—then property changed its nature, and its idea became complex. The legists knew this very well, but instead of opposing, as they ought, this accumulation of profits, they accepted and sanctioned the whole.

The legists knew this very well, but instead of opposing, as they ought, this accumulation of profits, they accepted and sanctioned the whole. And as the right of farm-rent necesarily [sic] implies the right of use⁠—in other words, as the right to cultivate land by the labor of a slave supposes one’s power to cultivate it himself, according to the principle that the greater includes the less⁠—the name property was reserved to designate this double right, and that of possession was adopted to designate the right of use. Whence property came to be called the perfect right, the right of domain, the eminent right, the heroic or quiritaire right⁠—in Latin, jus perfectum, jus optimum, jus quiritarium, jus dominii, while possession became assimilated to farm-rent.

Now, that individual possession exists of right, or, better, from natural necessity, all philosophers admit, and can easily be demonstrated; but when, in imitation of M. Cousin, we assume it to be the basis of the domain of property, we fall into the sophism called sophisma amphiboliae vel ambiguitatis, which consists in changing the meaning by a verbal equivocation. People often think themselves very profound, because, by the aid of expressions of extreme generality, they appear to rise to the height of absolute ideas, and thus deceive inexperienced minds; and, what is worse, this is commonly called examining abstractions.

If the art of correcting the errors of speech by scientific methods is ever discovered, then philosophy will have found its criterion of certainty. Now, then, the difference between property and possession being well established, and it being settled that the former, for the reasons which I have just given, must necessarily disappear, is it best, for the slight advantage of restoring an etymology, to retain the word property? My opinion is that it would be very unwise to do so, and I will tell why.

Key Concepts

• You say, proletaires of the Peuple, “For the very reason that men and things exist, there always will be men who will possess things; nothing, therefore, can destroy property.”
• you unconsciously argue exactly after the manner of M. Cousin, who always reasons from possession to property.
• Originally, the word property was synonymous with proper or individual possession. It designated each individual’s special right to the use of a thing.
• when the usufructuary converted his right to personally use the thing into the right to use it by his neighbor’s labor⁠—then property changed its nature, and its idea became complex.
• the name property was reserved to designate this double right, and that of possession was adopted to designate the right of use.
• we fall into the sophism called sophisma amphiboliae vel ambiguitatis, which consists in changing the meaning by a verbal equivocation.
• the difference between property and possession being well established, and it being settled that the former, for the reasons which I have just given, must necessarily disappear

Context

Second Memoir, responding to the Journal du Peuple’s popular argument and to Victor Cousin; Proudhon clarifies the historical-legal evolution of the terms 'property' and 'possession' to show that natural possession does not justify domanial property, and that linguistic ambiguity underlies philosophical errors in defending property.