Key Arguments

• Proudhon states that sovereignty is commonly defined as "the power to make laws" and immediately calls this "another absurdity, a relic of despotism": "But what is sovereignty? It is, they say, the power to make laws.10 Another absurdity, a relic of despotism."
• He traces this notion to monarchical practice, where kings issued commands in the form "for such is our pleasure," and notes that the nation simply sought to enjoy this same pleasure after 1789: "The nation had long seen kings issuing their commands in this form: for such is our pleasure; it wished to taste in its turn the pleasure of making laws."
• For fifty years the nation has multiplied laws through representatives, and this legislative overproduction is framed as a kind of political game that has not ended: "For fifty years it has brought them forth by myriads; always, be it understood, through the agency of representatives. The play is far from ended."
• He shows that the definition of sovereignty as law‑making power is rooted in a prior definition of law as the expression of the sovereign’s will: "The definition of sovereignty was derived from the definition of the law. The law, they said, is the expression of the will of the sovereign: then, under a monarchy, the law is the expression of the will of the king; in a republic, the law is the expression of the will of the people."
• Aside from the change in the number of wills, both monarchical and republican conceptions are identical and share the same fundamental mistake: that law is an expression of will: "Aside from the difference in the number of wills, the two systems are exactly identical: both share the same error, namely, that the law is the expression of a will; it ought to be the expression of a fact."
• He explicitly blames Rousseau and the Social Contract, presenting them as the prophet and Koran of the new legislators, indicating that the revolutionary constitutional tradition inherited and codified this will‑based conception of law: "Moreover they followed good leaders: they took the citizen of Geneva for their prophet, and the contrat social for their Koran."

Source Quotes

As for the Emperor, the strong man so much adored and mourned by the nation, he never wanted to be dependent on it; but, as if intending to set its sovereignty at defiance, he dared to demand its suffrage: that is, its abdication, the abdication of this inalienable sovereignty; and he obtained it. But what is sovereignty? It is, they say, the power to make laws.10 Another absurdity, a relic of despotism. The nation had long seen kings issuing their commands in this form: for such is our pleasure; it wished to taste in its turn the pleasure of making laws.

It is, they say, the power to make laws.10 Another absurdity, a relic of despotism. The nation had long seen kings issuing their commands in this form: for such is our pleasure; it wished to taste in its turn the pleasure of making laws. For fifty years it has brought them forth by myriads; always, be it understood, through the agency of representatives.

The nation had long seen kings issuing their commands in this form: for such is our pleasure; it wished to taste in its turn the pleasure of making laws. For fifty years it has brought them forth by myriads; always, be it understood, through the agency of representatives. The play is far from ended. The definition of sovereignty was derived from the definition of the law.

The definition of sovereignty was derived from the definition of the law. The law, they said, is the expression of the will of the sovereign: then, under a monarchy, the law is the expression of the will of the king; in a republic, the law is the expression of the will of the people. Aside from the difference in the number of wills, the two systems are exactly identical: both share the same error, namely, that the law is the expression of a will; it ought to be the expression of a fact.

The law, they said, is the expression of the will of the sovereign: then, under a monarchy, the law is the expression of the will of the king; in a republic, the law is the expression of the will of the people. Aside from the difference in the number of wills, the two systems are exactly identical: both share the same error, namely, that the law is the expression of a will; it ought to be the expression of a fact. Moreover they followed good leaders: they took the citizen of Geneva for their prophet, and the contrat social for their Koran.

Aside from the difference in the number of wills, the two systems are exactly identical: both share the same error, namely, that the law is the expression of a will; it ought to be the expression of a fact. Moreover they followed good leaders: they took the citizen of Geneva for their prophet, and the contrat social for their Koran. Bias and prejudice are apparent in all the phrases of the new legislators.

Key Concepts

• But what is sovereignty? It is, they say, the power to make laws.10 Another absurdity, a relic of despotism.
• The nation had long seen kings issuing their commands in this form: for such is our pleasure; it wished to taste in its turn the pleasure of making laws.
• For fifty years it has brought them forth by myriads; always, be it understood, through the agency of representatives. The play is far from ended.
• The law, they said, is the expression of the will of the sovereign: then, under a monarchy, the law is the expression of the will of the king; in a republic, the law is the expression of the will of the people.
• both share the same error, namely, that the law is the expression of a will; it ought to be the expression of a fact.
• they took the citizen of Geneva for their prophet, and the contrat social for their Koran.

Context

Philosophical-political argument in Chapter I following the critique of 1789, where Proudhon attacks the Rousseauian and revolutionary identification of law with sovereign will and sovereignty with legislative power, proposing instead that true law must express objective social and natural facts rather than any arbitrary will.