Key Arguments

• He takes up Charles Comte’s argument that things are common when they exist in such large quantities that individual appropriation never harms others, and private when they are limited, and quotes his examples of air, light, and ocean water as common because "each one can appropriate as much as his needs require without detracting from the enjoyment of others."
• Proudhon "completes" Comte’s reasoning by extending it: if a man were prohibited from highway walking, resting in fields, sheltering in caves, lighting fires, or gleaning minimal subsistence, "such a man could not live," so "the earth⁠—like water, air, and light⁠—is a primary object of necessity which each has a right to use freely, without infringing another’s right."
• He highlights Comte’s claim that land should be private because it is limited: "The land is limited in amount. Then, according to M. Ch. Comte, it ought to be appropriated," and immediately reverses the conclusion: "It would seem, on the contrary, that he ought to say, Then it ought not to be appropriated."
• He clarifies that air, water, and light are common "not because they are inexhaustible, but because they are indispensable; and so indispensable that for that very reason Nature has created them in quantities almost infinite, in order that their plentifulness might prevent their appropriation." The true basis of commonness is necessity, not abundance per se.
• By the same logic, land is "indispensable to our existence⁠—consequently a common thing, consequently insusceptible of appropriation; but land is much scarcer than the other elements, therefore its use must be regulated, not for the profit of a few, but in the interest and for the security of all."
• He formulates the core egalitarian principle: "equality of rights is proved by equality of needs. Now, equality of rights, in the case of a commodity which is limited in amount, can be realized only by equality of possession"; thus, for land, the only just regime is some form of agrarian equality, not unequal private property.
• He remarks explicitly that "An agrarian law underlies M. Ch. Comte’s arguments" and that consistently pursuing any serious analysis of property leads to equality: "From whatever point we view this question of property⁠—provided we go to the bottom of it⁠—we reach equality."

Source Quotes

5. “If a man should be deprived of air for a few moments only, he would cease to exist, and a partial deprivation would cause him severe suffering; a partial or complete deprivation of food would produce like effects upon him though less suddenly; it would be the same, at least in certain climates! were he deprived of all clothing and shelter⁠ ⁠… To sustain life, then, man needs continually to appropriate many different things. But these things do not exist in like proportions. Some, such as the light of the stars, the atmosphere of the earth, the water composing the seas and oceans, exist in such large quantities that men cannot perceive any sensible increase or diminution; each one can appropriate as much as his needs require without detracting from the enjoyment of others, without causing them the least harm. Things of this sort are, so to speak, the common property of the human race; the only duty imposed upon each individual in this regard is that of infringing not at all upon the rights of others.” Let us complete the argument of M.

Comte. A man who should be prohibited from walking in the highways, from resting in the fields, from taking shelter in caves, from lighting fires, from picking berries, from gathering herbs and boiling them in a bit of baked clay⁠—such a man could not live. Consequently the earth⁠—like water, air, and light⁠—is a primary object of necessity which each has a right to use freely, without infringing another’s right. Why, then, is the earth appropriated?

Comte assures us that it is because it is not infinite. The land is limited in amount. Then, according to M. Ch. Comte, it ought to be appropriated. It would seem, on the contrary, that he ought to say, Then it ought not to be appropriated. Because, no matter how large a quantity of air or light anyone appropriates, no one is damaged thereby; there always remains enough for all.

This reasoning is not strictly logical. Water, air, and light are common things, not because they are inexhaustible, but because they are indispensable; and so indispensable that for that very reason Nature has created them in quantities almost infinite, in order that their plentifulness might prevent their appropriation. Likewise the land is indispensable to our existence⁠—consequently a common thing, consequently insusceptible of appropriation; but land is much scarcer than the other elements, therefore its use must be regulated, not for the profit of a few, but in the interest and for the security of all. In a word, equality of rights is proved by equality of needs.

Likewise the land is indispensable to our existence⁠—consequently a common thing, consequently insusceptible of appropriation; but land is much scarcer than the other elements, therefore its use must be regulated, not for the profit of a few, but in the interest and for the security of all. In a word, equality of rights is proved by equality of needs. Now, equality of rights, in the case of a commodity which is limited in amount, can be realized only by equality of possession. An agrarian law underlies M. Ch. Comte’s arguments. From whatever point we view this question of property⁠—provided we go to the bottom of it⁠—we reach equality. I will not insist farther on the distinction between things which can, and things which cannot, be appropriated.

Key Concepts

• To sustain life, then, man needs continually to appropriate many different things. But these things do not exist in like proportions. Some, such as the light of the stars, the atmosphere of the earth, the water composing the seas and oceans, exist in such large quantities that men cannot perceive any sensible increase or diminution; each one can appropriate as much as his needs require without detracting from the enjoyment of others, without causing them the least harm. Things of this sort are, so to speak, the common property of the human race;
• A man who should be prohibited from walking in the highways, from resting in the fields, from taking shelter in caves, from lighting fires, from picking berries, from gathering herbs and boiling them in a bit of baked clay⁠—such a man could not live. Consequently the earth⁠—like water, air, and light⁠—is a primary object of necessity which each has a right to use freely, without infringing another’s right.
• The land is limited in amount. Then, according to M. Ch. Comte, it ought to be appropriated. It would seem, on the contrary, that he ought to say, Then it ought not to be appropriated.
• Water, air, and light are common things, not because they are inexhaustible, but because they are indispensable; and so indispensable that for that very reason Nature has created them in quantities almost infinite, in order that their plentifulness might prevent their appropriation. Likewise the land is indispensable to our existence⁠—consequently a common thing, consequently insusceptible of appropriation; but land is much scarcer than the other elements, therefore its use must be regulated, not for the profit of a few, but in the interest and for the security of all.
• In a word, equality of rights is proved by equality of needs. Now, equality of rights, in the case of a commodity which is limited in amount, can be realized only by equality of possession. An agrarian law underlies M. Ch. Comte’s arguments. From whatever point we view this question of property⁠—provided we go to the bottom of it⁠—we reach equality.

Context

Later part of § 1, where Proudhon engages critically with Charles Comte’s attempt to distinguish common from private things by quantity, and transforms Comte’s own premises into an argument for the inappropriability of land and the necessity of equal possession based on equal needs.