Perplexity and self‑contradiction in answering about justice, honor, good, and expediency reveal Alcibiades’ ‘double ignorance’: he is ignorant of the greatest matters and yet believes he knows them, which is the most disgraceful and harmful kind of ignorance.

By Plato, from Alcibiade

Key Arguments

  • After Alcibiades admits that the just is expedient, Socrates asks if he is now ready to ridicule anyone who says that the just may be evil; Alcibiades responds, “I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants,” thus confessing cognitive instability.
  • Socrates contrasts this state with unproblematic knowledge: if asked how many eyes or hands he has, Alcibiades would not be “of different minds in successive instants,” precisely “because you would know,” indicating that firm, non‑wavering judgment is a sign of knowledge.
  • He attributes Alcibiades’ involuntary self‑contradictions to ignorance: “the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant,” and draws the general claim that if one is perplexed about just/unjust, honourable/dishonourable, good/evil, expedient/inexpedient, “the reason is that you are ignorant of them.”
  • Socrates then distinguishes simple ignorance from double ignorance by comparing cases where Alcibiades knows he is ignorant—such as “how to ascend into heaven” or “the preparation of food” or handling the rudder on a voyage—where he feels no perplexity and simply leaves the matter to experts, from cases like justice where Alcibiades both lacks knowledge and thinks he has it.
  • He notes that when people know they are ignorant, they “entrust their business to others,” and so there is “a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant,” implying that simple ignorance can be harmless if it defers to knowledge.
  • By elimination, those who err are “those only who do not know and think that they know,” and this, Alcibiades agrees, is “ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous,” becoming “most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters.”
  • Socrates gets Alcibiades to affirm that “the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient” are “the greatest matters,” and reminds him that these are exactly what perplex him; therefore, “you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them,” which Alcibiades fears is true.
  • He concludes by diagnosing Alcibiades’ overall condition: “you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind,” and that this ignorance has led him to “rush into politics before you are educated,” extending the point from individual psychology to political practice.

Source Quotes

SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil? ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants. SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?
ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not. SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants? ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should.
ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should. SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know? ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant? ALCIBIADES: Very likely.
ALCIBIADES: Very likely. SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear?
ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot. SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it? ALCIBIADES: I imagine not.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know. ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those. SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous? ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters? ALCIBIADES: By far.
ALCIBIADES: By far. SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient? ALCIBIADES: There cannot be.
SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular.

Key Concepts

  • I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.
  • Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?
  • You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know?
  • And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?
  • if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity.
  • Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?
  • there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.
  • Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?
  • And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?
  • And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?
  • you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated.

Context

Immediately after securing Alcibiades’ admission that the just is expedient, Socrates turns to analyze Alcibiades’ shifting answers, using them to articulate the distinction between simple ignorance and the ‘ignorance that thinks it knows’, and to apply this diagnosis to Alcibiades’ political ambitions.