Self‑knowledge is achieved by the soul ‘looking’ at the divine, rational part of itself and of reality, just as an eye sees itself by looking into another eye or a mirror; this Delphic self‑knowledge is wisdom and is necessary for knowing one’s own good, belongings, and consequently for political competence.

By Plato, from Alcibiade

Key Arguments

  • Socrates reinterprets the Delphic maxim through an analogy with sight: if one says to the eye 'See thyself,' this means the eye must look at that in which it can see itself, namely mirrors and especially another eye.
  • He notes that the eye has something 'of the nature of a mirror' and that when one looks into another’s eye, in the 'pupil' there appears 'a sort of image of the person looking'; thus the eye sees itself by looking at that part of the other eye which is 'the instrument of vision' and where the eye’s virtue (sight) resides.
  • He generalizes: the eye will not see itself by looking at anything unlike this; it must look 'at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides.'
  • He transfers this structure to the soul: if the soul is ever to know herself, 'she must look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this.'
  • He identifies the most divine part of the soul as that 'which has to do with wisdom and knowledge'; this rational part 'resembles the divine,' so one who looks at it and 'at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself.'
  • From this he reinforces that 'self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom,' and infers that without self‑knowledge and wisdom it is impossible to know one’s own good and evil, or to recognize what truly belongs to oneself.
  • He shows that knowing belongings depends on knowing the self: if you did not know Alcibiades, 'there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his,' and likewise we cannot know 'that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves.'
  • He corrects their earlier concession that one might know their belongings yet not know themselves, arguing instead that 'the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.'

Source Quotes

SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking? ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly. SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes? ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly. SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking? ALCIBIADES: That is quite true.
ALCIBIADES: That is quite true. SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself? ALCIBIADES: That is evident.
ALCIBIADES: Very true. SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides? ALCIBIADES: True.
ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates.
ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates. SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? ALCIBIADES: There is none.
ALCIBIADES: There is none. SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself? ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
ALCIBIADES: Clearly. SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? ALCIBIADES: True.
ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil? ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art. ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed.

Key Concepts

  • Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?
  • Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept?
  • And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.
  • is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?
  • in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking?
  • Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?
  • Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?
  • And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?
  • And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?
  • Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?
  • And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?
  • But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?
  • Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

Context

In the central metaphysical climax of the dialogue, Socrates offers the mirror‑of‑the‑eye analogy to explicate the Delphic maxim: the soul must look at the divine, rational part of itself and of reality to know itself; this self‑knowledge is wisdom, prerequisite for recognizing one’s good and one’s belongings, paving the way for the subsequent argument that such knowledge is necessary for sound household and political governance.