The just, the honorable, the good, and the expedient ultimately coincide; therefore what is truly just is also honorable, good, and expedient.
Key Arguments
- He begins from Alcibiades’ initial concession that some just things are expedient and some are not, then asks whether anything just can be dishonorable, leading Alcibiades to say he has never known “any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just,” so “All just things are honourable.”
- He next examines whether what is honorable is always good. Alcibiades first claims that “some honourable things are evil,” using the case of rescuing comrades in war where one is wounded or killed; Socrates separates the courage from the resulting wounds and death, showing the courage itself is something Alcibiades prizes above life and thus is a great good.
- Socrates has Alcibiades admit that he would “rather die than be a coward,” that cowardice is “the worst of evils,” and that life and courage are the opposite and most desired things, implying that courage is among “the greatest goods,” and thus that the courageous rescue is good insofar as it manifests courage.
- He resolves the apparent paradox by distinguishing respects: an action can be ‘evil in respect of the death which ensues’ but ‘honourable in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save’; then he gets Alcibiades to agree that we call such an action ‘honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil’ and that to call it ‘honourable and yet evil’ is effectively to say ‘good and yet evil,’ which is self‑contradictory.
- He sharpens the point: “Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good,” thus tying honor and goodness together at the level of what they are ‘as such’.
- He further argues that “he who acts honourably acts well,” that “he who acts well is happy,” and that “the happy are those who obtain good,” so “acting well is a good” and therefore “the good and the honourable are again identified.”
- Having established that the honorable is good, he elicits from Alcibiades that “the good” is “expedient,” and then recalls their earlier admission that “those who acted justly must also act honourably,” chaining the equivalences: just → honourable → good → expedient, and concluding “Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient.”
- Socrates stresses that this conclusion comes from Alcibiades’ own admissions—“out of your own mouth”—underscoring that the argument is not imposed externally but drawn from Alcibiades’ conceded beliefs.
Source Quotes
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just? ALCIBIADES: Never.
ALCIBIADES: Never. SOCRATES: All just things are honourable? ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good? ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil. SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?
ALCIBIADES: True. SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage? ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage? ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward. SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?
ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:—You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them? ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates. SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good. ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy? ALCIBIADES: Of course. SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good? ALCIBIADES: True.
ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified. ALCIBIADES: Manifestly.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not? ALCIBIADES: Expedient. SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?
SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just? ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably. SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient? ALCIBIADES: I should infer so.
Key Concepts
- I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?
- All just things are honourable?
- I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil.
- And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?
- At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage? ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward.
- Might we not describe their different effects as follows:—You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?
- Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.
- he who acts honourably acts well? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy? ALCIBIADES: Of course. SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?
- Then the good and the honourable are again identified.
- And is the good expedient or not? ALCIBIADES: Expedient.
- if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably. SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? ALCIBIADES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?
Context
Socrates resumes the challenge to Alcibiades’ earlier claim that justice and expediency diverge, and by a chain of questions about honour, courage, happiness, and good, forces Alcibiades to recognize that the just necessarily coincides with the honorable, the good, and thus the expedient.