Although true opinion is as practically useful a guide as knowledge while it lasts, knowledge is more valuable because it is ‘tied down’ by an account of its cause, making it stable and enduring; Socrates illustrates this with the image of Daedalus’ statues and identifies the tying‑down with recollection.

By Plato, from Meno

Key Arguments

  • Meno admits he ‘wonder[s] that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they should ever differ’ once it has been granted that right opinion guides action just as well.
  • Socrates answers with the Daedalus analogy: the famous statues ‘require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.’
  • He explains that statues which are not secured ‘are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art.’
  • He applies the image to cognition: ‘Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long.’
  • Because of this instability, true opinions ‘are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it.’
  • Once fastened, ‘they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding’, which is ‘why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.’
  • Socrates adds that although he ‘speak[s] rather in ignorance; I only conjecture’, he is nonetheless certain ‘that knowledge differs from true opinion … There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.’

Source Quotes

Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion? MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they should ever differ. SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?
MENO: What have they to do with the question? SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away. MENO: Well, what of that?
MENO: Well, what of that? SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it.
SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding.
But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain. MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.
And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them. MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.

Key Concepts

  • I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they should ever differ.
  • Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.
  • they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art.
  • this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause;
  • and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it.
  • this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.
  • There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.

Context

Following the Larisa example and the recognition that right opinion can guide action as well as knowledge, Socrates answers Meno’s ‘value problem’ by distinguishing the stability of knowledge from the fugitive character of true opinion, using the mythic statues of Daedalus and explicitly linking the stabilization of opinion to recollection.