Key Arguments

• He elicits agreement that virtue is a good and that 'if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable', so 'virtue is profitable'.
• He shows that external goods like 'Health and strength, and beauty and wealth' are only profitable when 'rightly used' and 'hurtful when they are not rightly used', introducing the idea of a guiding principle of right use.
• He lists 'the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like', and notes that traits such as courage and temperance are sometimes profitable and sometimes harmful when not accompanied by understanding.
• He analyzes 'courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence', arguing that 'When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited', generalizing that 'whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful'.
• He concludes generally that 'all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite', so the value of soul‑traits depends entirely on wisdom or folly.
• From this dependency, he infers: 'none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence'.
• He then extends the same structure to external goods, arguing that 'the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly', and universalizes: 'All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable.'
• On this basis he sums up: 'thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom.'

Source Quotes

MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside. MENO: Certainly.

MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable? MENO: Yes.

MENO: Yes. SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable? MENO: That is the only inference.

MENO: True. SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so? MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used? MENO: Certainly.

MENO: Certainly. SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like? MENO: Surely.

MENO: Surely. SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? MENO: True.

MENO: True. SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful? MENO: Very true.

MENO: Very true. SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite? MENO: That appears to be true.

MENO: That appears to be true. SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? MENO: I quite agree.

SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable? MENO: Certainly.

MENO: Certainly. SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom? MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.

Key Concepts

• Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.
• And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable?
• Then virtue is profitable?
• And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm
• are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
• temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like
• courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
• whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?
• all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite
• none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?
• all other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable?
• thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?

Context

At the start of this passage, after adopting the method of hypothesis, Socrates leads Meno through an examination of goods of body, external fortune, and soul to argue that their profitability depends on wisdom, and therefore that virtue, being profitable and a quality of the soul, must itself be a kind of wisdom or prudence.