Key Arguments

• Sensible equals (e.g., ‘pieces of wood and stone’) sometimes appear equal and sometimes unequal, whereas ‘real equals’ or ‘the idea of equality’ never admit inequality, so the sensible equals are different from Equality Itself.
• When we judge that sensible equals ‘aim at being some other thing, but fall short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior,’ we must already know that other thing (absolute equality) in order to compare and find the sensible instances wanting.
• We ‘conceived and attained’ the idea of equality ‘from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality’, so the sight of sensible equals occasions the thought of a distinct, superior standard.
• This cognitive move—‘whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike’—is defined as ‘an act of recollection’.
• Since we ‘saw and heard and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born’, but can only judge sensibles by a prior standard of absolute equality, we must have acquired the knowledge of equality ‘at some previous time’.
• Socrates concludes that this previous time is ‘before we were born’, because no later time fits the data about our use of the senses and subsequent recognition of equality.
• Learning therefore is described as ‘a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us’, and ‘may not this be rightly termed recollection?’

Source Quotes

stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal? That is certain.

That is certain. But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality? Impossible, Socrates.

Impossible, Socrates. Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality? I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior? Certainly.

Yes. But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection? Very true.

Precisely. Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it? Very true.

Yes. Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short. No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.

Quite true, Socrates. But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection? Very true.

Key Concepts

• stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
• But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?
• Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
• when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior?
• whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?
• we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?
• Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality
• if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?

Context

Continuation of the Theory of Recollection argument: Socrates refines his earlier account by focusing on equality, arguing from our judgment of sensible equals as falling short of absolute Equality to the conclusion that we must have known Equality before any sensory experience, thus making learning recollection.