A third part of the soul—spirit (thumos)—is distinct from appetite and naturally allies with reason against desire.
By Plato, from The Republic
Key Arguments
- Leontius anecdote: anger and desire wage war, revealing spirit as a power that can oppose appetite.
- Self-reproach cases: when desires prevail, one becomes angry at oneself; in such faction-like conflicts, spirit sides with reason.
- Nobility test: if one believes one has wronged another, spirit refuses to be roused against just suffering; but when believing oneself wronged, spirit pursues what seems just despite pains.
- Shepherd-dog image: reason quiets spirit like a shepherd his dog, matching the political image of rulers and auxiliaries.
- Developmental evidence: children show spirited reactions early, before reasoning matures; animals display spirit though lacking reason.
- Poetic authority: Homer’s line indicates the reasoning power rebukes unreasoning anger, implying distinct faculties.
- Conclusion: as in the city’s three classes, the soul has three parts—reason, spirit, appetite.
Source Quotes
The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight. I have heard the story myself, he said.
I have heard the story myself, he said. The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things. Yes; that is the meaning, he said.
Yes; that is the meaning, he said. And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason;—but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else? Certainly not.
But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more. The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.
Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason. But that is easily proved:—We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough. Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying.
Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us, 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul,' for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it. Very true, he said.
Very true, he said. And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number. Exactly.
Key Concepts
- Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.
- anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.
- his spirit is on the side of his reason;
- until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.
- they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason
- 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul,' for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.
- the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.
Context
Having separated reason from appetite, Socrates argues that spirit (thumos) is a third, distinct principle that, when uncorrupted, naturally supports reason against desire.
Perspectives
- Plato
- Affirms the tripartition as the psychic ground of the city’s class structure; thumos is a quasi-rational auxiliary that must be educated to serve logos.
- Socrates
- Emphasizes empirical and poetic evidence: everyday anger and shame show spirit’s alignment with reason when properly trained.