Key Arguments

• Glaucon distinguishes three kinds of goods: those valued 'for their own sakes,' those valued both in themselves and for their results (e.g., 'knowledge, sight, health'), and those valued only for their consequences though disagreeable (e.g., 'gymnastic' and 'money-making').
• Socrates explicitly places justice 'In the highest class' among goods desired both intrinsically and instrumentally.
• Glaucon reports that 'the many' rank justice among burdensome goods sought for reputation and rewards, indicating a gap between philosophical claim and popular opinion.

Source Quotes

Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:—How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them? I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.

I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied. Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results? Certainly, I said.

Certainly, I said. And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them? There is, I said, this third class also.

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice? In the highest class, I replied,—among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results. Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

In the highest class, I replied,—among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results. Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided. I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice.

Key Concepts

• are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences
• Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?
• And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result
• In the highest class, I replied,—among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.
• the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation

Context

Book II opening: Glaucon reopens the debate after Thrasymachus withdraws by introducing a tripartite taxonomy of goods and pressing Socrates to say where justice belongs; Socrates says justice is in the highest class, while 'the many' disagree.

Perspectives

Plato

Endorses Socrates’ placement as the target conclusion of the dialogue; the taxonomy frames the ensuing project to show justice’s intrinsic goodness beyond external rewards, culminating later in the soul/city harmony and the Form of the Good.

Socrates

Affirms justice as good in itself and for its consequences; he recognizes popular misvaluation as a challenge to be met by argument rather than by appealing to reputation.