Key Arguments

• When he merely suspends judgment in cases of insufficient knowledge, he "act[s] rightly, and [is] not deceived"; error appears only when he resolves to affirm or deny without prior clear understanding.
• He insists that "it is a dictate of the natural light, that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will," so any exercise of will that outruns understanding violates this rule.
• Even if he happens to judge truly without clear understanding, he says he "stumble[s] upon it by chance, and do[es] not therefore escape the imputation of a wrong use of [his] freedom," showing that the fault lies in the will’s manner of use, not in the outcome.
• He defines the nature of error: "it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error," locating the defect in the act of willing as it proceeds from himself.
• He carefully distinguishes: "Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him," thereby exonerating the God‑given powers themselves.

Source Quotes

it is plain that I act rightly, and am not deceived; but if I resolve to deny or affirm, I then do not make a right use of my free will; and if I affirm what is false, it is evident that I am deceived; moreover, even although I judge according to truth, I stumble upon it by chance, and do not therefore escape the imputation of a wrong use of my freedom; for it is a dictate of the natural light, that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will. And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error.

it is plain that I act rightly, and am not deceived; but if I resolve to deny or affirm, I then do not make a right use of my free will; and if I affirm what is false, it is evident that I am deceived; moreover, even although I judge according to truth, I stumble upon it by chance, and do not therefore escape the imputation of a wrong use of my freedom; for it is a dictate of the natural light, that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will. And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him.

And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him. For I have assuredly no reason to complain that God has not given me a greater power of intelligence or more perfect natural light than he has actually bestowed, since it is of the nature of a finite understanding not to comprehend many things, and of the nature of a created understanding to be finite; on the contrary, I have every reason to render thanks to God, who owed me nothing, for having given me all the perfections I possess, and I should be far from thinking that he has unjustly deprived me of, or kept back, the other perfections which he has not bestowed upon me.

Key Concepts

• it is plain that I act rightly, and am not deceived; but if I resolve to deny or affirm, I then do not make a right use of my free will; and if I affirm what is false, it is evident that I am deceived; moreover, even although I judge according to truth, I stumble upon it by chance, and do not therefore escape the imputation of a wrong use of my freedom; for it is a dictate of the natural light, that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will.
• And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error.
• Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him.

Context

Meditation IV, continuing the analysis of truth and error, where Descartes refines his earlier distinction between understanding and will by locating error precisely in the will’s transgression of the bounds set by clear and distinct perception.