Key Arguments

• Recognizing that his attention sometimes lapses and sensible images obscure his intellectual vision, he proposes to inquire further whether he, who has the idea of God, could exist if there were no God, and considers possible sources of his existence: himself, his parents, or other causes less perfect than God.
• He reasons that if he were independent of every other existence and the author of his own being, he would doubt nothing, desire nothing, and lack no perfection; he would have bestowed upon himself every perfection of which he has the idea and thus would be God.
• He dismisses the thought that the perfections he now lacks might be harder to acquire than those he already has, arguing instead that it is "a matter of much higher difficulty" that he, a thinking being, should arise from nothing than to acquire new items of knowledge, which are merely accidents of a thinking substance.
• Hence, if he possessed in himself the greater perfection required to bring himself into existence from nothing, he would also possess the lesser power to add further accidental perfections and so would not lack any of the perfections whose ideas he has; since he does lack them, he cannot be self-caused and must depend on a more perfect cause.

Source Quotes

And, truly, I see nothing in all that I have now said which it is not easy for any one, who shall carefully consider it, to discern by the natural light; but when I allow my attention in some degree to relax, the vision of my mind being obscured, and, as it were, blinded by the images of sensible objects, I do not readily remember the reason why the idea of a being more perfect than myself, must of necessity have proceeded from a being in reality more perfect. On this account I am here desirous to inquire further, whether I, who possess this idea of God, could exist supposing there were no God. And I ask, from whom could I, in that case, derive my existence ?

And I ask, from whom could I, in that case, derive my existence ? Perhaps from myself, or from my parents, or from some other causes less perfect than God; for anything more perfect, or even equal to God, cannot be thought or imagined. But if I [were independent of every other existence, and] were myself the author of my being, I should doubt of nothing, I should desire nothing, and, in fine, no perfection would be awanting to me; for I should have bestowed upon myself every perfection of which I possess the idea, and I should thus be God.

Perhaps from myself, or from my parents, or from some other causes less perfect than God; for anything more perfect, or even equal to God, cannot be thought or imagined. But if I [were independent of every other existence, and] were myself the author of my being, I should doubt of nothing, I should desire nothing, and, in fine, no perfection would be awanting to me; for I should have bestowed upon myself every perfection of which I possess the idea, and I should thus be God. And it must not be imagined that what is now wanting to me is perhaps of more difficult acquisition than that of which I am already possessed; for, on the contrary, it is quite manifest that it was a matter of much higher difficulty that I, a thinking being, should arise from nothing, than it would be for me to acquire the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant, and which are merely the accidents of a thinking substance; and certainly, if I possessed of myself the greater perfection of which I have now spoken [in other words, if I were

But if I [were independent of every other existence, and] were myself the author of my being, I should doubt of nothing, I should desire nothing, and, in fine, no perfection would be awanting to me; for I should have bestowed upon myself every perfection of which I possess the idea, and I should thus be God. And it must not be imagined that what is now wanting to me is perhaps of more difficult acquisition than that of which I am already possessed; for, on the contrary, it is quite manifest that it was a matter of much higher difficulty that I, a thinking being, should arise from nothing, than it would be for me to acquire the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant, and which are merely the accidents of a thinking substance; and certainly, if I possessed of myself the greater perfection of which I have now spoken [in other words, if I were

Key Concepts

• I am here desirous to inquire further, whether I, who possess this idea of God, could exist supposing there were no God.
• Perhaps from myself, or from my parents, or from some other causes less perfect than God; for anything more perfect, or even equal to God, cannot be thought or imagined.
• if I [were independent of every other existence, and] were myself the author of my being, I should doubt of nothing, I should desire nothing, and, in fine, no perfection would be awanting to me; for I should have bestowed upon myself every perfection of which I possess the idea, and I should thus be God.
• it is quite manifest that it was a matter of much higher difficulty that I, a thinking being, should arise from nothing, than it would be for me to acquire the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant, and which are merely the accidents of a thinking substance;

Context

Toward the end of the provided Meditation III passage, Descartes supplements the argument from the idea of God with a causal inquiry into the source of his own existence, arguing that neither he himself nor lesser causes can adequately explain it.