Action vs. passion: we act when we are the adequate cause of what happens in or from us (understanda… — Baruch Spinoza

Action vs. passion: we act when we are the adequate cause of what happens in or from us (understandable through our nature alone); we are passive when what happens in or from us follows while we are only a partial cause.

By Baruch Spinoza, from Ethics

Key Arguments

Action is explicated via Definition I: 'that is (by the foregoing definition)'—the event is intelligible through our nature alone.
Passivity is marked when the event 'takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally,' but we are 'only the partial cause.'

Source Quotes

II. I say that we act when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause.

I say that we act when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause. III.

Key Concepts

I say that we act when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause;
that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.
On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause.

Context

Ethics, Part III, DEFINITIONS II (lines 1740–1747); operational criterion for agency used throughout Parts III–V