Key Arguments

• Images are bodily modifications; conceiving a similar nature involves a similar modification in us, producing a like emotion
• If we hate the similar other, the affect becomes contrary rather than similar
• Corollary I: we love those who pleasurably affect something similar to us and hate those who painfully affect it
• Corollary II: we cannot hate what we pity since pity’s pain makes rejoicing at its pain impossible
• Corollary III: we endeavor, as far as we can, to free from misery what we pity

Source Quotes

Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain. PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion (affectus). Proof.—The images of things are modifications of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of the external bodies as present.

Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion. Q.E.D. Note I.—This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire.

If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion. Q.E.D. Note I.—This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire. Corollary I.—If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.

Q.E.D. Note I.—This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire. Corollary I.—If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him. Proof.—This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

Proof.—This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi. Corollary II.—We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully. Proof.—If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Proof.—If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Corollary III.—We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity. Proof.—That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition); therefore,

Key Concepts

• PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion (affectus).
• If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion.
• This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire, it is called emulation
• Corollary I.—If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
• Corollary II.—We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully.
• Corollary III.—We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity.

Context

Ethics, Part III, Proposition XXVII with Proof, Note I, and Corollaries I–III (lines 2009–2142); doctrine of the imitation of affects and its social-moral consequences