Key Arguments

• He previously defined appetite as the essence of man determined to act for self-preservation and desire as appetite with consciousness; yet he insists the appetite remains the same whether or not one is conscious, thus he recognizes no strict difference.
• To avoid tautology, he defines desire to include the causal role of a modification of essence that explains consciousness of desire.
• Modifications of a man’s essence can be innate or conceived under Thought, Extension, or both; hence the scope of ‘desire’ includes all endeavours and volitions shaped by such dispositions, which may pull in opposing directions.

Source Quotes

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS I. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Explanation.—We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence.

Explanation.—We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite.

Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add, in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c. For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn.

For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn. II.

Key Concepts

• Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.
• I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire.
• by a modification of man's essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
• By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn.

Context

Ethics, Part III, Definitions of the Emotions I with Explanation (lines 2650–approx. 2680)