Love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause; the common definition as a wish to unite with the beloved expresses only a property, not love’s essence, and ‘wish’ is not a free decision but contentment at the beloved’s presence that sustains pleasure.

By Baruch Spinoza, from Ethics

Key Arguments

  • He distinguishes essence (pleasure with an external cause) from a derivative property (wish to unite), criticizing other authors for obscurity stemming from not grasping the essence.
  • He rejects construing ‘wish’ as consent, conclusion, or free decision (which he calls fictitious), or as a desire tied to absence/presence; instead it is the lover’s contentment that strengthens or maintains pleasure.
  • This aligns with his broader denial of free decision of the mind.

Source Quotes

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for I am not aware that any emotions are named after them. VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Explanation—This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure.
Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Explanation—This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
Explanation—This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained. VII.

Key Concepts

  • VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
  • the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a property, but not the essence of love;
  • I do not here mean by wish consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious);
  • by wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

Context

Ethics, Part III, Definitions of the Emotions VI with Explanation (lines ~2721–2734)