Our perceptions of others (e.g., ‘Peter’) differ depending on whether the idea is Peter’s own essence or another’s idea of Peter; the latter chiefly reflects the perceiver’s bodily disposition rather than Peter’s nature.

By Baruch Spinoza, from Ethics

Key Arguments

  • He distinguishes the idea constituting Peter’s essence from Paul’s idea of Peter: the former ‘only implies existence so long as Peter exists,’ while the latter ‘indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s body.’
  • This illustrates Corollary II of Prop. XVI that ideas of external bodies indicate our own body’s constitution more than the external’s nature.

Source Quotes

II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists.
Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things.

Key Concepts

  • the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.
  • The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter

Context

Ethics II, Prop. XVII, Note (lines 1074–1200); application of II. xvi. corollaries to intersubjective perception.