Key Arguments

• He claims that assurance of truth arises from the simple possession of a corresponding idea, identifying truth as its own standard.
• He adds that insofar as the mind perceives truly it participates in the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.), therefore its clear and distinct ideas are as necessarily true as God’s ideas.

Source Quotes

From what is there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question—as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object—in other words, that truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi.

As for the last question—as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object—in other words, that truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God. PROP.

Key Concepts

• his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object—in other words, that truth is its own standard.
• our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.

Context

Ethics II, transition into Prop. XLIV (lines 1465–1596); concluding remarks on truth and certainty from earlier results